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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS:
UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
CHARLES D. ABLARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent national security cases in the United States bring
to mind two cases that the American team observed in the United
Kingdom during the course of the Seventh Anglo-American Ex-
change. At the time, the two English cases appeared unique to the
American observers. In light of the abundance of "spy trials" in
the United States in 1985, however, the two proceedings in the
United Kingdom may have greater relevance in the United States
than was initially apparent. Indeed, 1985 produced the greatest
number of espionage cases ever recorded in the United States,
which prompted a committee of the American Bar Association to
label it "the year of the spy." u
Both English cases, Secretary of State v. Guardian Newspapers
Ltd.2 and Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte Council of Civil
Service Unions' (GCHQ), were tried in the High Court of Justice,
appealed to the Court of Appeal, and finally decided by the House
of Lords. Notable counterparts in the United States in 1985 in-
cluded United States v. Morison,4 which involved leaks of classi-
fied photographic material to a British publication, and United
States v. Walker,5 which concerned alleged sales of classified Navy
* Partner, Gage & Tucker, Washington, D.C.
1. American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Law
and National Security 1985: The Year in Review, INTELLIGENCE REP., Jan. 1986, at 1.
2. [1983] T.L.R., No. 765 (Ch. Dec. 16, 1983), aff'd on other grounds, [1984] Ch. 156 (C.A.
1983), aff'd, [1985] A.C. 339 (1984).
3. [1984] T.L.R., No. 459 (Q.B. July 17, 1984), rev'd, [1984] T.L.R., No. 518 (C.A. Aug. 7,
1984), afld sub nom. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., [1985]
A.C. 374 (1984).
4. Crim. No. Y-84-00455 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 1985).
5. Crim. No. H-85-0309 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 1985).
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defense intelligence to the Soviet Union.' After closely examining
the deliberations of the English courts in Guardian Newspapers
and GCHQ, this Article compares these decisions with contempo-
rary national security cases in the United States, noting carefully
the lessons that can be derived from the British experience in this
area.
II. THE ENGLISH CASES
A. Secretary of State v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd.
The first of the two English cases, Guardian Newspapers, in-
volved a clerk in the Ministry of Defence who had leaked a copy of
a secret government memorandum to Guardian Newspapers Ltd.
7
The memorandum, which was signed by the Secretary of Defence
and addressed to the Prime Minister, suggested ways to handle
public relations when the first United States cruise missiles arrived
in Great Britain at RAF Greenham Common. After considering the
matter for approximately ten days, Guardian Newspapers had
published it. The government had made a written demand for re-
turn of the document, and the editor had proposed to return it
after cutting off a corner which had certain identifying marks. The
government had rejected this offer, however, and had brought suit
against Guardian Newspapers.'
At trial, the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice con-
sidered the "source protection" law that Parliament had enacted in
1981, which provides in part:
No court may require a person to disclose ... the source of in-
formation contained in a publication for which he is responsible,
unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that dis-
closure is necessary in the interests of justice or national secur-
ity or for the prevention of disorder or crime. 9
6. The "year of the spy" produced many other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Chin,
Crim. No. 85-00263A (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 23, 1985); United States v. Pollard, Magistrate
No. 85-778M-01 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 1985).
7. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. publishes The Guardian, a well respected, left-of-center,
nationally circulated newspaper generally regarded as being among the top three or four
newspapers in Great Britain.
8. See [1984] Ch. at 160-61.
9. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49, § 10.
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The High Court held that this protection does not apply when an
owner is trying to recover misappropriated property. As a result,
the court concluded that the government was entitled to the
memorandum.10
The Court of Appeal, presided over by Sir John Donaldson,
Master of the Rolls, upheld the High Court's decision on several
grounds. All three judges delivered opinions. Sir John Donaldson,
summarizing the reasoning of the court, stated:
Whether or not the editor acted in the public interest in pub-
lishing this document is not the issue. The Secretary of State's
concern is quite different. It is that a servant of the Crown who
handles classified documents has decided for himself whether
classified information should be disseminated to the public. If
he can do it on this occasion, he may do it on others when the
safety of the state will truly be imperiled. The editor will no
doubt retort that in such circumstances he would not publish,
but the responsibility for deciding what should and should not
be published is that of the government of the day and not that
of individual civil servants or editors. Furthermore-and this is
the Secretary of State's case-friendly foreign states may well
be prepared to entrust the government of the day with sensitive
information if its security is in the hands of ministers, but will
not be prepared to do so if it is in the hands of individual civil
servants or editors.1"
Guardian Newspapers then turned over the document. The gov-
ernment soon discovered the informant's identity-perhaps
through the identifying marks, although the source never was ad-
mitted officially-and it prosecuted the informant under the Offi-
cial Secrets Acts. 2 The informant pleaded guilty and the court
sentenced her to six months in prison."3 Despite her plight, how-
ever, Guardian Newspapers carried its appeal to the House of
Lords.
10. [1983] T.L.R., No. 765.
11. [1984] Ch. at 162-63.
12. See [1985] A.C. at 351 (citing Official Secrets Acts, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28).
13. See id.
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In July 1984, Sydney Kentridge argued the case for Guardian
Newspapers14 before the House of Lords Appellate Committee, a
group of five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who are known as "Law
Lords." At that point, the whole case arguably was moot because
Guardian Newspapers had turned over the document and the in-
formant had been convicted and sentenced, and had served her
term. 15 The Law Lords, however, noted that the real issue in the
case was not the contents of that particular document, but the
threat that such leaks could recur.16 That issue provided the House
of Lords with a sufficient reason to hear the case.
Based on two days of oral argument, 17 the Law Lords handed
down their decision in October 1984. They unanimously decided
that the full scope of section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act,
198118 protects newspapers from legal proceedings designed to
compel them to disclose their sources of information, 9 but that its
protection must be qualified when it conflicts with various other
aspects of the public interest.20 The Act is consistent with this
qualification, according to the Lords, because it conditions com-
pelled disclosure upon a showing that disclosure is necessary to
promote justice, national security, or the prevention of disorder or
crime.21 Thus, the House of Lords concluded that the protection of
section 10 overrides the lawful owner's right to restoration of a
document. 22
The Law Lords divided three to two, however, as to whether the
evidence before the trial judge would have justified the holding
that disclosure was necessary in the interest of national security if
the judge had decided the issue based on a proper interpretation of
the law rather than on the assumption that the Act did not apply
14. See id. at 341-43. Sydney Kentridge is one of the leading civil rights lawyers in South
Africa.
15. The informant, in fact, just had been released, and she had attended the oral presen-
tation before the Appellate Committee.
16. [1985] A.C. at 343 (Lord Scarman).
17. This lengthy oral argument contrasted sharply with the written submissions in the
case. Each side submitted a brief that was no more than 15 pages long.
18. Ch. 49, § 10; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., [1985] A.C. at 349 (Lord Diplock).
20. See, e.g., id. at 349-50.
21. See id. at 350-51.
22. See id. at 349.
[Vol. 27:753
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS
in cases involving misappropriated property. The Law Lords
agreed that the document was rather innocuous and that it had
little value to anyone with evil designs on the national security.23
They also concluded that the affidavit before the judge on behalf
of the Ministry of Defence made only a perfunctory showing of ne-
cessity.2 4 Three of the five Lords, however, concluded that the evi-
dence in the case was adequate to sustain the finding of necessity,
although barely so. 25
The oral arguments in Guardian Newspapers were intriguing,
and they raised important issues concerning the ability of the
Crown to act in the interest of national security. At the time, how-
ever, a second case involving national security issues was receiving
greater attention. As The Times of London opined in an editorial
the day after the Lords decided Guardian Newspapers, the oral
arguments sounded like "rehearsals"26 for that second case-
GCHQ.
B. Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte Council of Civil Service
Unions (GCHQ)
The dispute in GCHQ concerned the banning of trade unions at
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) at Chel-
tenham, which is the British equivalent of the National Security
Agency at Ft. Meade, Maryland. From 1979 to 1981, GCHQ work-
ers had disrupted operations several times through short strikes
and other acts of protest. The most serious disruption came in
1981, when twenty-five percent of the GCHQ labor force partici-
pated in a one-day strike, which prompted the government to con-
sider a ban on worker combinations. The government originally
had rejected the idea because it never had acknowledged publicly
the intelligence functions of the GCHQ, and an acknowledgment of
those functions might have been necessary to justify a ban. In
1983, however, a Security Commission report publicly had
23. See, e.g., id. at 357 (Lord Fraser).
24. See, e.g., id. at 353-55 (Lord Diplock).
25. Id. at 356 (Lord Diplock); id. at 371 (Lord Roskill); id. at 373 (Lord Bridge). Lord
Fraser and Lord Scarman dissented from this holding. Id. at 359 (Lord Fraser); id. at 367
(Lord Scarman).
26. The Times of London, Oct. 26, 1984, at 17, col. 3.
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acknowledged the GCHQ's intelligence functions and, shortly
thereafter, the Minister for the Civil Service had decided to ban
union membership at the GCHQ. After the government had re-
jected a compromise offered by the unions in the form of a "no
disruption" agreement, the ban had become effective in March
1984.27
The Council of Civil Service Unions, a confederation of trade
unions that included the six unions that had been represented at
the GCHQ, sought judicial review of the ban in the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice. Justice Glidewell, a rela-
tively junior member of the High Court,28 granted leave to seek
review on March 8, 1984 and delivered judgment on July 16. He
noted that the Minister for the Civil Service had imposed the ban
through power derived from an Order in Council 29 issued under the
Royal Prerogative. Justice Glidewell held, however, that exercises
of powers granted under the Royal Prerogative are subject to the
same scrutiny that applies to exercises of powers granted by stat-
ute.30 Justice Glidewell stated that the Crown had the power under
its Royal Prerogative to vary the terms and conditions of service
for civil servants, but that it could not exercise that power
unilaterally.
27. See [1985] A.C. at 394-96 (Lord Fraser). The government, in imposing the ban, had
offered one thousand pounds to each employee who renounced membership in the
union-an approach to labor relations that most Americans probably would find surprising.
Approximately ninety-five percent of the GCHQ staff had accepted the offer.
28. Justice Glidewell since has been promoted to the Court of Appeal, an interesting com-
mentary on the independence of judicial selection in Great Britain in view of the general
feeling that his decision in favor of the union membership was an embarrassment to the
government and to the Prime Minister. The Court of Appeal and the Law Lords apparently
were convinced that the national security argument had not been presented properly at the
High Court.
29. Order in Council, 1982, art. 4. This order provides, in pertinent part:
As regards Her Majesty's Home Civil Service-(a) the Minister for the Civil
Service may from time to time make regulations or give instructions-. . . (ii)
for controlling the conduct of the service, and providing for the classification of
all persons employed therein and . . . the conditions of service of all such
persons....
Id.
30. [1984] T.L.R., No. 459.
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Instead, according to Justice Glidewell, the rules of "natural jus-
tice" 31 require a Minister who contemplates withdrawal of rights
relating to membership in trade unions and to freedom from unfair
dismissals to consult with the workers involved, or with their rep-
resentatives in the various unions. Justice Glidewell concluded that
the staff of the GCHQ had a "legitimate expectation" that the
Minister would consult them or their unions before making any
decision affecting their right to join a union.2
Soon after the High Court's decision, the trade unions mounted
a campaign to win back the membership of some 7000 employees
in the GCHQ and in certain other stations that had been affected
by the ban.33 The government then considered accepting the ruling
of the lower court and entering into the type of negotiations that
the High Court had indicated it should have undertaken before it
had terminated the workers' right to join a union. Ultimately, how-
ever, the government chose to take the matter to the Court of Ap-
peal. On August 6, 1984, that court reversed the High Court, ruling
that the Prime Minister had acted within the law and that the fail-
ure to consult the workers prior to imposing the ban had not vio-
lated "natural justice. '3 4 According to Lord Chief Justice Lane,
who chaired the three judge panel of the Court of Appeal, the
courts have no power to interfere with governmental decisions
grounded on national security considerations. Although a court
might be able to inquire into the Royal Prerogative in other areas,
it cannot inquire into "any action taken. . which can truly be
said to have been taken in the interests of national security," such
as the ban on unions in GCHQ.35 In essence, the court held that
the Crown is the sole judge of what the national security requires,36
and that once it invokes the national security justification, all
31. The British courts use the phrase "natural justice" frequently in a manner closely
akin to the concept of "due process" in the United States. During the review of GCHQ in
the House of Lords, however, Lord Roskill suggested that the phrase should be discarded
and that the concept of a "duty to act fairly" should replace it. [1985] A.C. at 414.
32. [1984] T.L.R., No. 459 (Q.B. July 17, 1984).
33. The Times of London, July 17, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
34. [1984] T.L.R., No. 518 (C.A. Aug. 7, 1984).
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77, 107 (P.C.)) ("Those who are responsible for
the national security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires.").
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other considerations, such as the prior consultation argument in
GCHQ, become moot.37
The unions appealed this decision to the House of Lords and, in
October, a five member panel of the Law Lords heard oral argu-
ments. After six days of oral arguments, the Law Lords took the
case under consideration and, on November 22, 1984, they deliv-
ered their opinion orally to the House of Lords. 8 With national
security again the critical issue, the Lords unanimously upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeal in favor of the government. Accord-
ing to the Lords, the GCHQ employees normally would have had a
legitimate expectation that they would be consulted before the ban
was imposed,39 but these fairness considerations can be outweighed
by the requirements of national security.40 These requirements
were solely for the executive to decide, and not the courts, the
Lords stated, and the evidence showed in this case that the govern-
ment had considered all the proper factors before it made its
determination.41
Although the decision to dismiss the appeal ultimately rested on
national security grounds, all five Law' Lords also discussed
whether judicial review laid for Orders in Council derived from the
Royal Prerogative. Their conclusions concerning this issue indicate
that the courts may review such cases much more closely when
37. Both the Court of Appeal and the High Court criticized the Prime Minister for issu-
ing the critical instruction to ban trade unions merely by informing the cabinet secretaries
orally, terming this oral notification a "surprising" way to take such an action. Id.; see
[1984] T.L.R., No. 459. The Economist commented: "[I]f government decisions are intended
to have legal effect, they should surely be both written and public." ECONoMisT, Aug. 11,
1984, at 50. The Economist also subjected the decision of the Court of Appeal to more
general criticism, noting the opinion of Neil Kinnock, leader of the opposition Labor party,
that the decision gave the "government an unlimited license which is open to abuse and
which contradicts all the values of our democracy." Id.
38. This oral presentation in the chambers of the House of Lords was rather unusual, and
it illustrates the degree of attention that the case received. Opinions of the Law Lords,
although cast as speeches in the House of Lords, usually are written opinions; they rarely
are delivered orally.
39. See, e.g., [1985] A.C. at 401 (Lord Fraser). This exception, however, did not rise to the
level of a legal right to consultation. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 401-03.
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issues of national security are not involved.42 Like the High
Court,4 3 the Lords rejected the proposition that judicial review of
Orders in Council issued under the Royal Prerogative should be
more limited than review of Orders issued under the authority of
statutes enacted by the Parliament.44 Because the Government had
invoked the national security justification, however, the Lords held
that they could not invoke these general rules of review to chal-
lenge the discretion of the Prime Minister in this area.45
42. See, e.g., id. at 399 (indicating that courts should not construe an Order in Council
differently merely because it was made under the authority of the Royal Prerogative rather
than under the authority of a statute).
43. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
44. See [1985] A.C. at 399 (Lord Fraser).
45. See id. at 401-03.
Besides the two cases witnessed during the Exchange, a dispute now being contested in
the courts of the United Kingdom and Australia is reminiscent of parallel national security
cases in the United States. The dispute revolves around the attempt of Peter Wright, a
former official of MI5, the British intelligence service, to publish his memoirs, which, among
other things, contain an accusation that Sir Roger Hollis, the former head of M15, was a
Soviet agent. The British Government has responded by filing an action against Wright and
his publisher in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, where the book was to
be published, to enjoin publication. The Australian court is expected to rule later this year.
See The Times of London, Sept. 17, 1985, at 9, col. 4 (action filed); id., Mar. 25, 1986, at 7,
col. 1 (describing the issues); id., June 3, 1986, at 9, col. 4 (describing oral argument); id.,
July 18, 1986, at 5, col. 8 (describing additional evidence to be given later in 1986). The
British Government also has succeeded in obtaining an injunction in its courts against pub-
lication of excerpts of Wright's book by two English newspapers, including The Guardian.
Attorney-General v. The Observer Ltd., T.L.R., No. 434 (C.A. July 26, 1986).
This dispute is reminiscent of Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), in which the
United States Supreme Court found that a former CIA employee had violated his employ-
ment contract by publishing a book without prior clearance by the agency. The Court found
that the publication had irreparably harmed the United States Government, id. at 513, and
it imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the book for the benefit of the United
States. Id. at 515-16. The proceedings concerning Wright's book are distinguishable from
Snepp, however, because no contractual provisions are involved and the British Govern-
ment is resting its claim purely on national security considerations.
The injunction against The Observer Ltd. and Guardian Newspapers Ltd., like the earlier
Guardian Newspapers case, also provides an interesting contrast to the less deferential view
of government claims of national security considerations taken by the United States Su-
preme Court in the Pentagon Papers Case. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In
fact, unlike Guardian Newspapers, the recent Observer case cannot be distinguished on the
grounds that it does not involve a prior restraint on speech. See infra note 48 and accompa-
nying text. If the injunction is upheld by the House of Lords, it will demonstrate even more
clearly the great difference between the approaches of the two countries to government
claims that restrictions on the press are necessary to protect national security interests. See
infra text following note 62.
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY CASES IN THE UNITED STATES: COMPARISON
AND CONTRAST
In both British cases, the courts had to consider whether the
government had demonstrated sufficiently that the action in ques-
tion was necessary in the interest of national security. This issue
was reminiscent of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. United States"1 (Pentagon Pa-
pers Case), in which the United States government sought to pre-
vent publication of Department of Defense documents on the
grounds that such a prohibition was necessary in the interest of
national security. In the Pentagon Papers Case, unlike the English
cases, the Court held that the government had not made the requi-
site showing of necessity.4 7 The Pentagon Papers Case, however, is
distinguishable from the two English cases because it involved an
attempt to impose a prior restraint on speech rather than an at-
tempt to require a newspaper to hand over a document to the gov-
ernment or an attempt to regulate union membership. Because of
the involvement of a prior restraint on speech, the government in
the Pentagon Papers Case had to shoulder a much heavier burden
in demonstrating necessity than the Crown had to shoulder in
Guardian Newspapers or GCHQ.4 8
46. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 714.
48. Id. In the oral arguments in Guardian Newspapers, counsel for the newspaper cited
three other United States cases to support the contention that journalists should not be
compelled to disclose their sources unless all other means of obtaining the desired informa-
tion had been exhausted. See [1985] A.C. at 342 (citing In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979);
and Cary v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The Law Lords ruled that these three
cases also were inapposite because, even if the United Kingdom did recognize a right for
journalists analogous to the one granted in the United States through the first amendment,
no evidence indicated that the Crown in fact had not made other attempts to obtain the
information and had found those attempts fruitless. See id. at 367 (Lord Scarman).
Floyd Abrams, who represented the New York Times Company in an of counsel capacity
in the Pentagon Papers Case, stated in a recent seminar, in response to a question about
the decision of the British courts in GCHQ, that he would advise clients in the United
States that they had no obligation to return a secret document that came into their hands
and that no United States court would force them to do so. THE MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT
LEAKS 8 (P. Cathcart & D. Fletcher eds. 1984) (report of a conference cosponsored by the
Standing Committee on Law and National Security, American Bar Association, and the Me-
dia Institute).
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Several of the issues in the United States "spy trials" in 1985,
however, are not as easily distinguishable. In fact, one of these
cases, United States v. Morison,49 presented national security is-
sues that were quite similar to the issue presented in Guardian
Newspapers. In Morison, as in Guardian Newspapers, the
controversy centered around an individual's decision to leak cer-
tain material to the press, and the press' decision to publish it.
Specifically, the defendant in Morison was charged with sending
three secret photographs and some other classified information to
Jane's Defense Weekly, a British magazine.5 Morison's apparent
motive was to provide information that in his opinion deserved
public exposure, and possibly to secure employment with the pub-
lication. 5' He was not involved, however, in a scheme to spy for a
foreign power for cash, as was involved in other recent cases such
as United States v. Walker.2
Morison, like Guardian Newspapers, turned chiefly on the issue
of government document protection, this time in the context of the
United States laws dealing with espionage53 and theft of govern-
ment property.5 4 In moving to dismiss the charges, Morison con-
tended that a theft of "information" does not constitute a theft of
government "property" under the applicable statute.5 Morison
also maintained, with the support of amicus briefs submitted by
members of the United States press, that the legislative history of
the law concerning espionage indicated that Congress was con-
cerned with the release of information to spies and saboteurs, but
not with leaks to the press.56 The district court denied Morison's
motion to dismiss, stating that the law concerning theft of
49. Crim. No. Y-84-00455 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 1985).
50. See United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 657 (D. Md. 1985) (memorandum and
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss), appeal dismissed without opinion, 774 F.2d
1156 (4th Cir. 1985).
51. See id. at 659 (noting Morison's argument that he was not a "spy" in the classic sense
of the word); see also United States v. Morison, 622 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1985) (further
proceedings) (granting government's motion to exclude testimony relating to the patriotism
of the defendant over defendant's objection that it showed the absence of an improper
motive).
52. Crim. No. H-85-0309 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 1985); see supra text accompanying note 6.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1982).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
55. See 604 F. Supp. at 658.
56. See id. at 658, 659.
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property had been applied in at least two other cases involving the
disclosure of classified information,"1 and that the law concerning
espionage should apply to anyone who uses a security clearance to
obtain classified information to release it to the world.5,
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the defendant
in Morison argued that the United States law governing espionage
is constitutionally overbroad because it uniformly restricts the first
amendment right freely to disseminate the information contained
in certain documents whether or not those documents contain in-
formation so sensitive to the national security that the government
would have a compelling interest in preventing its disclosure suffi-
cient to outweigh first amendment concerns.59 The court also dis-
missed this argument, but not without demonstrating some sympa-
thy to first amendment considerations. According to the court, any
possible overbreadth problem could be cured by giving a jury in-
struction requiring a finding that the government had proved each
document sufficiently "relate[d] to the national defense" as to
come within the language of this statute."0 The court, therefore,
refused to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss.
By reading this requirement of proof into the statute, the court
effectively imposed a significant burden on the government to
demonstrate that its classification of a document was necessary for
the national security and that the information contained was not
merely "harmless material."" This judicial second-guessing of gov-
ernment national security decisions contrasts starkly with the def-
erential attitude of the British courts in cases such as Guardian
Newspapers and GCHQ, in which the courts held that decisions
57. Id. at 663 (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 919 (4th Cir.
1980), and United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979)). The court also
noted that the government had attempted to apply the section to the theft of classified
information in its widely publicized prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg, but that that attempt
had been aborted because of prosecutorial misconduct. See id. (citing United States v.
Elsberg, 687 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1982)). The court did note, however, that Judge Winter of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which is the court that will
review any appeal in Morison, has contended that the law concerning theft of government
property does not apply to theft of classified government information. See id. (citing United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 922-28 (1980) (Winter, J., concurring)).
58. Id. at 659.
59. Id. at 660.
60. Id. at 660-61.
61. See id. at 661.
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involving national security are the sole prerogative of the Crown
and that the courts can look only into whether those decisions
were made in good faith and not into the merits of the Crown's
determinations.62 Recent United States cases such as Morison,
which indicate on facts at least analogous to recent English cases
that the United States courts are willing to examine the merits of
the government's national security decisions even though the facts
involve less compelling first amendment considerations than those
involved in the Pentagon Papers Case, show that the difference
between the approaches of the two countries' judiciaries in na-
tional security cases is real and not merely fact-based. The English
courts are significantly more deferential.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although comparisons between the United States and the
United Kingdom often are strained, especially in the areas of con-
stitutional law and relations between the executive and the judici-
ary, one can say without much fear of contradiction, in light of
recent cases in both countries, that the English courts are much
more deferential than their American counterparts to executive de-
cisions involving national security. One could posit many compli-
cated theories involving differences in the two countries' systems
and structures of government in an attempt to explain this differ-
ence. The real distinction, however, may lie in the fact that the
British traditionally place much greater faith in their executive
branch than Americans do, as evidenced by the statement of Lord
Denning, Master of the Rolls, in a 1977 case involving the deporta-
tion of an American reporter who allegedly was prepared to pub-
lish information concerning GCHQ:
There is a conflict here between the interests of national se-
curity on the one hand and the freedom of the individual on the
other. The balance between these two is not for a court of law. It
is for the Home Secretary. He is the person entrusted by Parlia-
ment with the task. In some parts of the world national security
62. See supra notes 36-37 & 45 and accompanying text.
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has on occasions been used as an excuse for all sorts of infringe-
ments of individual liberty. But not in England. 3
63. R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766, 783 (C.A.), petition
for leave to appeal dismissed, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 789 (H.L.).
[Vol. 27:753
